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AGORA: MAY THE PRESIDENT VIOLATE
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW? (CONT'D)
FEDERAL STATUTES, EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
"SELF-EXECUTING CUSTOM"
A hotly debated issue raised in this publication's October 1986 Agora'
and, repeatedly, during the drafting of the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (Revised) has to do with the relationship between
customary international law and federal law in the United States. Most of
the debate addressed whether a newly emerged custom would supersede an
earlier federal statute or self-executing treaty. The reporters of the Restate-
ment took a strong stand at first, placing custom on the same plane as federal
statutes and self-executing treaties: in case of conflict, the latest in time
should prevail." Criticism rolled in, and the reporters eventually retreated
a bit. The final version says only that since custom and international agree-
ments have equal authority in international law, and both are law of the
United States, "arguably later customary law should be given effect as law
of the United States, even in the face of an earlier law or agreement, just
as a later international agreement of the United States is given effect in the
face of an earlier law or agreement. '
A related question is whether custom could ever supersede a federal ex-
ecutive act, as a matter of U.S. law. Put conversely, the question is whether
a federal executive act would prevail over a contrary customary rule. A
recent case, Garcia-Mir v. Meese,4 has redirected the debate toward this ques-
tion. Professor Henkin appears to have the best of the debate so far, but his
position still needs some modification. To that end, one must focus on the
President's "sole" powers and on what could be called "self-executing
custom."
Garcia-Mir dealt with an executive act as well as a congressional enactment.
Cuban refugees were being detained in the Atlanta Penitentiary, as exclud-
able aliens. One group had committed crimes in Cuba before joining the
"freedom flotilla" to the United States, and consequently was never paroled
into this country. A second group had been paroled into the United States,
but parole was subsequently revoked. In the trial court, both groups obtained
I See Agora: May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 80 AJIL 913 (1986) (pieces
by Professors Charney, Glennon and Henkin); see also Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana:
Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U.L. REv.
322 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana].
2 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT (REvisED)] § 135 comment b and Reporters' Note 1 (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1980).
5 Id. §135 Reporters' Note 4 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
4 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert denied sub norn. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S.Ct. 289
(1986).
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an order directing the U.S. Government to provide a separate parole rev-
ocation hearing for each refugee. On appeal, one issue was whether custom-
ary international law prohibiting prolonged arbitrary detention' required
that the refugees be given individual hearings or released.
The court quoted well-known language from The Paquete Habana: "Where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations."'"
Taking this to mean that any executive or legislative act would prevail over
custom-apparently without regard to whichever is later in time--the court
found that a 1980 legislative act precluded the application of customary
international law to the first group and an executive act (by the Attorney
General) precluded its application to the second group.
It is questionable whether there was indeed a preclusive legislative act as
to the first group.7 1 do not propose to address that issue. If the court was
correct as to Congress's intent, the later-in-time rule would be on the side
of the congressional enactment. However, if the custom was later in time,
there is a question not recognized by the revised Restatement that should be
answered before the custom could "arguably" prevail.
To examine the question, it is necessary to begin with an elementary point
about treaties. Only self-executing treaties have the effect of federal (do-
mestic) law in the United States. Not all treaties are self-executing. The same
principle clearly should apply to customary international law. Although it
is not common parlance to speak of "self-executing custom," it is apparent
that certain rules of custom are, in effect, self-executing and others are not.
The most obvious and most important of the potentially self-executing rules
are many of those protecting basic human rights. They benefit individuals
directly, and they are specific enough to be enforced judicially.
At the non-self-executing end of the spectrum would be most norms deal-
ing with highly political types of intergovernmental conduct. Professor
Henkin has given some examples (overflying foreign territory without con-
sent, bringing down a foreign aircraft, violating a diplomat's immunity), but
he has not dubbed them "non-self-executing." ' In fact, he has said elsewhere,
quite flatly, that customary international law is "self-executing." ' His own
examples show that such a flat statement cannot be justified.
The rule against prolonged arbitrary detention would be a "self-executing
5See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 2, §702 (Tent. Draft No. 6, vol. 1, 1985);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, GA Res. 217A, UN Doc. A/8 10, at
71 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 9(1), GA
Res. 2200, 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966); Fernandez v. Wilk-
inson, 505 F.Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez
v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). See also Lillich, Invoking International Human
Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 367, 402-04 (1985).
6 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
'See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d at 1454 n.9.
6 Henkin, The President and International Law, in Agora, supra note 1, at 930, 935.
9 Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1555, 1561, 1566
(1984).
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custom," though not at the level of a peremptory norm.10 Thus, if any
nonperemptory rule of custom could supersede an earlier federal statute,
this one could. As a self-executing norm, it could stand on its own entirely
apart from whatever auxiliary role it might play as an aid in interpreting
constitutional rights and liberties.
With due respect, however, to the view of the reporters of the revised
Restatement, it is extremely doubtful whether any customary rule, qua custom,
could prevail over a validly enacted earlier federal statute." Custom exists
as an independent source of U.S. law only as federal common law. 12 At least
in fields other than foreign relations, common law-including federal com-
mon law-yields to enacted statutory law. Usually, that comes up in the
context of a statute later in time than the common law rule, but in a dem-
ocratic society that has placed rule-making power in the hands of elected
representatives, the principle is the same whether the enacted law is earlier
or later in time than the nonconstitutional common law rule. Thus, in
Garcia-Mir, even if the custom were later in time, it should not prevail as a
nonconstitutional common law rule in the case of the first group of refu-
gees-provided, of course, that Congress actually intended to authorize
indefinite detention.
The result should be different, however, for the second group of refugees.
It certainly does not follow from what has been said above that any otherwise-
valid federal executive act would prevail over an earlier or later customary
rule. In Garcia-Mir, the parties and the court focused on the question whether
an executive act would have to emanate from the President, himself, to
override contrary custom. The court thought not, and held that a decision
by the Attorney General (to incarcerate the refugees indefinitely, pending
deportation) would suffice.' This holding does not fully address the issue.
Even if the President had personally ordered the indefinite detention of
the second group of refugees, the contrary rule of customary international
'0 See Lillich, supra note 5, at 404 n.177.
"A possible exception would be a customary rule in whose development the President, or
his high-ranking delegate, had actively participated as commander-in-chief of the armed forces
or as the chief U.S. diplomat. He does seem to have domestic lawmaking power under these
constitutional grants of authority, narrowly applied. See the discussion in the text at notes 14-
17.
t See Glennon, Can the President Do No Wrong?, in Agora, supra note 1, at 923; Glennon,
Raising The Paquete Habana, supra note 1, at 343-47. Cf. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) §131
comment d (Tent. Draft No. 6, vol. 1, 1985). Professor Henkin has argued that custom is only
like common law in that it is unwritten. See Henkin, supra note 8, at 933; Henkin, supra note
9, at 1561-62. But no court has ever found unwritten federal law to be anything other than
federal common law.
Custom may also inform constitutional provisions, particularly in the Bill of Rights. In that
context, custom is an aid to constitutional interpretation, not an independent source of law.
As such, it could properly be said to be of a higher order than nonconstitutional federal law,
whether statutory or common law. The court in Garcia-Mir treated the unadmitted aliens as
not eligible for protection by "the core values of the Due Process Clause per se." 788 F.2d at
1447. That may be questionable, but I do not propose here to challenge it.
" To the contrary, see Chamey, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Government
to Violate Customary International Law, in Agora, supra note 1, at 913, 919-22.
374 THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 81
law should prevail in a U.S. court.' 4 The President has broad constitutional
power to conduct foreign affairs, but his power is not unlimited. In particular,
his independent power to take action that has domestic lawmaking effect
must necessarily be subject to some constraints emanating from the Article
I, section 1 grant of all legislative powers to Congress. That grant should
preclude the President from exercising independent legislative powers, ex-
cept to the extent that domestic legislative effect is a necessary concomitant
of an Article II power granted to the President alone.
There are three Article II grants that might qualify. They are the grant
of authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces; the authority to
receive ambassadors and other public ministers (i.e., to be the chief diplomat);
and the authority to execute faithfully the laws of the United States.'- The
latter grant, though sometimes regarded as a source of independent presi-
dential authority, obviously is not. To treat it as a source of independent
authority would simply be to grant undefined and undefinable powers to
the presidency. Neither the intent of the Framers nor the practice of the
last 200 years supports any such untamed presidential authority.
Much more convincing is the argument that, in the absence of authori-
zation from an act of Congress, the President's domestic lawmaking power
emanates only from his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief and
as chief diplomat. This would give him such legislative power as is necessary
for the effective use of the armed forces against opposing armed forces (at
least in the event of a congressionally declared war or a true necessity for
immediate self-defense), as well as lawmaking authority in the contexts of
the recognition of foreign governments,' 6 the diplomatic representation of
American nationals in their dealings with foreign governments, and other
essentially diplomatic functions. These are rather narrow powers, as well
they should be in a constitutional system that allocates "all legislative powers"
to Congress.1
7
In Garcia-Mir, this means that the refugee-detention decision of the ex-
ecutive branch should not have prevailed over a contrary "self-executing"
rule of customary international law. This would be true whether the custom
crystallized before or after the executive branch's decision, and whether the
decision was made by the President himself or by someone else in the ex-
ecutive branch. The decision to detain refugees simply was not the type of
decision entrusted to a commander-in-chief of the armed forces or to a
diplomat carrying out normal diplomatic functions. It was made by the At-
torney General, essentially to maintain law and order. It is immaterial that
'4 But see Charney, supra note 13.
"Cf. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 39-44 (1972).
16 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942).7 Professor Henkin gives the President too much latitude when he contemplates independent
presidential power stemming from a role defined as the "sole organ" in foreign affairs, as well
as from the commander-in-chief role. See Henkin, supra note 8, at 934, 936. He is the "sole
organ" as chief diplomat, but that is a narrower category than Professor Henkin seems to have
in mind.
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the Attorney General's authority to deal with refugees stems from a foreign
relations statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 There is no indi-
cation of congressional intent in that Act to authorize a step that would
violate international law.
If a decision of the executive branch is not made by the President himself,
or by authority the President has clearly delegated to a high-ranking civilian
Defense Department official (in the case of the commander-in-chief power)
or to a high-ranking State Department official (in the case of diplomacy),
the presumption should be that it is not within the powers of the commander-
in-chief or of the chief diplomat. If the presumption is not convincingly
rebutted, "self-executing custom" should prevail as a matter of federal com-
mon law. Even if the executive branch's act is by the President or his high-
ranking civilian delegate, "self-executing custom" should prevail unless the
act squarely comes within one of the two relevant Article II powers.'
FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR.*
THE PRESIDENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A MISSING DIMENSION
As the chairman of the panel at the 1985 ASIL Annual Meeting on the
question "May the President Violate Customary International Law?" I must
confess that the issue that originally troubled me when I suggested this topic
for discussion remains securely hidden in the shadows of the debate. Yet I
think it is of central importance. The reason it has remained obscure, despite
its significance, is that it is an extraordinarily difficult intellectual puzzle. My
brief purpose here is to bring it into the light, not to try to solve it.
We can begin by noting an organizing principle that appears to have been
accepted either explicitly or implicitly by all of the persons who have con-
tributed so far to the debate. The organizing principle is that there are two
distinct questions involved here: (1) May the President, under the law of the
United States, violate international law? and (2) May the United States, under
international law, violate international law? The second question has been
posed somewhat differently in the debate, such as: May Congress violate
international law? or May the President, with explicit congressional approval,
violate international law? But these are just variants on the question.
As I have put the second question, the answer would seem to be logically
compelled. How could international law be legally violated by any country?
1s8 U.S.C. §§1101 et seq. (1982).
'9 This is a narrower point than some commentators have made. In an interesting article
containing much historical analysis, Professor Lobel argues that explicit congressional approval
is necessary for the President to override customary international law. See Lobel, The Limits of
Constituttonal Power: Conflicts between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071,
1120 (1985). See also Glennon, in Agora, supra note 1, at 924, 930; Glennon, Raising The
Paquete Habana, supra note 1, at 331-39, 363.
* Of the Board of Editors.
